Antares Research

WannaCry: Anatomy of a Ransomware Outbreak

PHYO PAING HTUN ChiLai ·

WannaCry report cover

Executive Summary

This report documents the investigation of a WannaCry (WanaCrypt0r 2.0) ransomware infection observed in a controlled system environment. WannaCry is a self-propagating cryptoworm that encrypts user files and demands a Bitcoin ransom for their recovery. The specimen analysed (SHA-256 ed01ebfb…080e41aa) exhibited the family’s hallmark behaviour: an initial kill-switch domain check, rapid mass encryption of user data, deployment of a multi-language ransom interface, and establishment of persistence and anonymised network communication.

Execution began when the user launched the malware, which immediately queried its kill-switch domain. With the domain unresolved, the malware proceeded to spawn a chain of child processes to hide files, grant broad permissions, establish a Run-key for persistence, and display the ransom note. It generated cryptographic key files, appended the .WNCRYT extension to victim files at roughly 100 files per minute, distributed @Please_Read_Me@.txt across user directories, and changed the desktop wallpaper to the ransom message. Outbound TCP connections to Tor directory infrastructure (81.30.158.213:9001) indicated an attempt to establish an anonymous command-and-control channel.

The infection maps to several MITRE ATT&CK techniques including User Execution (T1204), Registry Run Keys persistence (T1547.001), Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486), and Inhibit System Recovery (T1490). The single mutex Global\MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA0 prevents re-infection and is a reliable host-based indicator. The sections below summarise the response and mitigation actions, strategic recommendations, and provide ready-to-deploy YARA and Sigma detection rules derived from the indicators of compromise identified during this investigation.

Key Findings at a Glance

Family / impact: WanaCrypt0r 2.0; demands $300–$600 in Bitcoin with a 3-day / 7-day escalation deadline.

Entry / trigger: User execution of WannaCry.exe, followed by a kill-switch domain check that failed to resolve.

Persistence: HKCU Run key “osdfomamndej119” → tasksche.exe ensures autostart on logon.

Impact: 10,000+ files encrypted with the .WNCRYT extension at ~100 files/min.

Network: Outbound Tor connection to 81.30.158.213:9001 for anonymised C2.

Strongest IOCs: Mutex Global\MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA0 and SHA-256 ed01ebfb…080e41aa.

ATTACK CHAIN

WannaCry evidence from page 2

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

WannaCry evidence from page 3
WannaCry evidence from page 3

Technical Details

1. Initial Infection - User Click

User double-clicked WannaCry.exe on desktop

Malware immediately performed kill-switch domain check

Domain resolution failed → encryption process initiated

WannaCry evidence from page 3
WannaCry evidence from page 4

Kill-Switch Mechanism

Domain Checked: www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com

WannaCry evidence from page 4

Process: @WanaDecryptor@.exe DLL Loaded: urlmon.dll (address 0x74850000) Result: Domain not found → Malware continued execution

Ransom Interface Display Window Details:

Title: "Wana Decrypt0r 2.0"

Background: Red with white lock icon

Payment Amount: $600 Bitcoin

Bitcoin Address: 12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SM

WannaCry evidence from page 4

Threat Messages: "Ooops, your files have been encrypted!"

Payment deadline: 3 days ($300 → $600)

File deletion threat: 7 days total

2. Process Creation & Execution Chain

Primary Process

Process Name: WannaCry.EXE Parent: explorer.exe (user-initiated) Location: C:\Users\.\Desktop\WannaCry.exe

WannaCry evidence from page 5

Child Processes Created

WannaCry evidence from page 5

Key Commands Executed

@WanaDecryptor@.exe ( Display Payment Windows )

Hide malicious files (attrib +h .)

Grant full permissions (icacls ./grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q)

Create persistence reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v "osdfomamndej119" /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Users\REM\Desktop\tasksche.exe" /f

Execute scripts (cscript.exe //nologo m.vbs)

taskdl.exe (The malware creates a thread that executes the process taskdl.exe every 30 seconds.)

Notepad.exe (Open @Please_Read_Me@.txt)

WannaCry evidence from page 6

3. File Operations & Encryption

Cryptographic Key Generation

Files Created:

00000000.eky - Encrypted private key

00000000.pky - Public key

Location: Desktop

Process: WannaCry.EXE

WannaCry evidence from page 6
WannaCry evidence from page 6

Ransom Note Distribution

File Name: @Please_Read_Me@.txt Locations:

Desktop

Documents

Downloads

AppData\Local

Multiple user directories

WannaCry evidence from page 7

Multi-Language Support

Language Files Created:

WannaCry evidence from page 7

Mass File Encryption

Encryption Pattern:

Extension Added: .WNCRYT Location: AppData\Local\Temp Files: 10845.WNCRYT → 11XXX.WNCRYT (sequential) Total Files: 10,000+ encrypted files Rate: 100 files per minute

WannaCry evidence from page 7

Desktop Wallpaper Change

Process: WallpaperChanger.exe New Background: Black with red warning text Message: "Ooops, your important files are encrypted"

WannaCry evidence from page 8

4. Registry Modifications

Persistence Mechanism

Registry Run Key:

Location: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Value Name: osdfomamndej119 Value Data: C:\Users\REM\Desktop\tasksche.exe Purpose: Autostart on user login

WannaCry evidence from page 8
WannaCry evidence from page 8

File Association Hijacking

WNCRYT Extension Registration:

Registry Key: HKEY_USERS\ [SID]\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts\.W NCRYT\OpenWithList Value: a Data: {1AC14E77-02E7-4E5D-B744-2EB1AE5198B7}\OpenWith.exe Result: .WNCRYT files open ransom interface

WannaCry evidence from page 9

Configuration Storage

WanaCrypt0r Settings:

Registry: HKCU\SOFTWARE\WanaCrypt0r Value: wd (working directory)

Data: C:\Users\.\Desktop

WannaCry evidence from page 9

Command and Control (C2) Traffic Analysis

Tor Network Infrastructure Usage

We triggered outbound TCP connections to 81.30.158.213:9001, indicating communication with Tor relay infrastructure on the standard Tor Directory Port.

The network traffic exhibited multiple connection attempts with distinct retransmission patterns, demonstrating persistent efforts to establish a command and control channel.

This behavior suggests the WannaCry variant was attempting to establish an anonymous communication channel for either command reception from threat actors or potential data exfiltration activities.

Evidence figure from page 9 of the source report
WannaCry evidence from page 10
Evidence figure from page 10 of the source report

5. Prefetch Analysis

WannaCry Execution History

File: WANNACRY.EXE-.pf, CSCRIPT.EXE-.pf,TASKDL.EXE-.pf, NOTEPAD.EXE-pf

Run Count: 10 executions Previous Runs: 14:23:32, 14:23:08, 14:22:35, 14:22:06, 14:21:44 Volume Information: Name: \VOLUME{01d80bcd7209d918-d072777f} Directories Accessed: 84 Files Referenced: 446

Key Referenced Files:

\USERS\REM\DESKTOP\WANNACRY.EXE (Main executable)

\WINDOWS\SYSWOW64\CMD.EXE (Command execution)

\WINDOWS\SYSWOW64\CSCRIPT.EXE (Script execution)

\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\NOTEPAD.EXE (Ransom note display)

WannaCry evidence from page 11
Evidence figure from page 11 of the source report
WannaCry evidence from page 11
Evidence figure from page 12 of the source report
WannaCry evidence from page 11
Evidence figure from page 13 of the source report

Command Execution Evidence

CMD.EXE Prefetch:

Referenced Command: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c 811738464378.bat Purpose: Execute persistence batch file Files: Registry modification commands

Evidence figure from page 13 of the source report

6. Memory Forensics Analysis

The initial malicious executable that created the process

Evidence figure from page 12 of the source report
Evidence figure from page 12 of the source report
WannaCry evidence from page 12
Evidence figure from page 14 of the source report

Process Privilege Escalation

WannaCry.EXE , @WanaDecryptor@.exe  - 36 System Privileges:

Evidence figure from page 14 of the source report
Evidence figure from page 14 of the source report

Loaded DLL Modules

WannaCry.EXE Memory Layout:

WannaCry evidence from page 12

@WanaDecryptor DLL Loading:

Evidence figure from page 15 of the source report

Mutex Analysis

Name: Global\MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA0 ( WannaCry Ransomware well known mutex)

WannaCry evidence from page 13

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

File Hashes

WannaCry.exe: ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa

Network Indicators

Kill-Switch Domain: www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com

Bitcoin Address: 12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw

Registry Keys

HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\osdfomamndej11 9 HKCU\SOFTWARE\WanaCrypt0r\wd

File Extensions & Names

Encrypted Files: .WNCRYT extension

Ransom Notes: @Please_Read_Me@.txt

Crypto Keys: 00000000.eky, 00000000.pky

Language Files: m_[language].wnry

Process Indicators

Mutex: Global\MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA0

Ransomware Infrastructure Intelligence Driven

Observed infrastructure (high level)

Sample: the starting point is the WannaCry.exe SHA256 above.

Domains/URLs: the graph contains multiple domain nodes and URLs associated with the sample (used for kill-switch checks, potential payload hosting and possibly telemetry/C2). Kill-switch domain observed in analysis: www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com (us ed by WannaCry family).

Remote IPs: the graph shows many contacted IPs (across multiple countries). These appear as C2/relay nodes and download hosts. (Export the graph to a CSV to get the authoritative list).

Network protocols / ports: evidence of DNS lookups, HTTP/HTTPS and standalone TCP connections (some captures show outbound connections to TCP ports such as 443 and other ephemeral/C2 ports).

Geographic distribution: flagged nodes show multiple country flags — infrastructure appears globally distributed (typical for resilient C2 and hosting).

Evidence figure from page 17 of the source report

Response & Mitigation

The following actions are organised by incident-response phase. Containment should preserve volatile evidence (memory) where forensic analysis is required, so isolate affected hosts at the network layer rather than powering them off.

Immediate Containment

Isolate infected hosts from the network (disable the switch port or pull the cable / disable Wi-Fi) without shutting them down, to halt propagation while preserving memory for forensics.

Allow the kill-switch domain (www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com) to resolve internally — do NOT block it. Successful resolution neutralises this variant’s encryption routine.

Block SMB traffic (TCP 445) and disable SMBv1 across the environment to stop EternalBlue-style lateral movement; segment the network to contain spread.

Block the C2 indicator 81.30.158.213 and restrict outbound Tor traffic at the perimeter.

Identify the scope by hunting for the host indicators (mutex, Run key, .WNCRYT files, @Please_Read_Me@.txt) across the estate.

Eradication

Terminate malicious processes (WannaCry.exe, @WanaDecryptor@.exe, tasksche.exe, taskdl.exe, taskse.exe) and remove the mutex by killing the process tree.

Delete the persistence Run key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\osdfomam ndej119 and remove the WanaCrypt0r configuration key HKCU\SOFTWARE\WanaCrypt0r.

Remove dropped artifacts: tasksche.exe, @WanaDecryptor@.exe, *.wnry, msg language files, ransom notes, and the .eky/.pky key files.

Where integrity cannot be assured, reimage affected systems from a known-good build rather than cleaning in place. Recovery

Restore encrypted data from known-good, offline or immutable backups after confirming the environment is clean.

Apply the MS17-010 security update and confirm SMBv1 is disabled before returning hosts to production.

Reset credentials that may have been exposed on affected hosts and monitor restored systems closely for recurrence.

Do not pay the ransom; payment does not guarantee recovery and funds further criminal activity. Engage legal and, where appropriate, law enforcement.

Recommendations

Preventive Controls

Maintain timely patching, prioritising MS17-010 / EternalBlue, and remove SMBv1 from all systems.

Block inbound/outbound TCP 445 and 139 at the perimeter and enforce internal network segmentation.

Deploy and tune EDR with behavioural ransomware detection (mass file modification, shadow-copy deletion, suspicious child-process chains).

Enforce least privilege and application allow-listing to limit execution of unauthorised binaries and scripts.

Strengthen email and web gateways and deliver user-awareness training, since user execution is the common entry point.

Detection Rules

The following rule is derived directly from the indicators of compromise documented in this report. They are intended for detection and threat-hunting; validate and tune thresholds in a test environment before production deployment.

YARA Rule — WannaCry Ransomware

rule WannaCry_Ransomware
{
    meta:
        description    = "Detects WannaCry / WanaCrypt0r 2.0 ransomware components"
        author         = "Chilai"
        date           = "2026-06-23"
        reference      = "Internal WannaCry Investigation Report"
        malware_family = "WannaCry"
        sha256         = "ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa"
        tlp            = "CLEAR"
    strings:
        $killswitch = "iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea" ascii wide nocase
        $mutex      = "Global\\MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA0"      ascii wide
        $reg        = "WanaCrypt0r" ascii wide nocase
        $note       = "@Please_Read_Me@.txt" ascii wide
        $decryptor  = "@WanaDecryptor@.exe" ascii wide
        $btc        = "12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw" ascii wide
        $msg        = "Ooops, your files have been encrypted"      ascii wide
        $magic      = "WANACRY!" ascii
        $hdr        = "WNcry@2ol7" ascii
        $ext1       = ".wnry" ascii wide nocase
        $ext2       = ".WNCRYT" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and filesize < 15MB and
        (
            any of ($magic, $hdr) or
            2 of ($killswitch, $mutex, $reg, $note, $decryptor, $btc, $msg) or
            (any of ($ext1, $ext2) and 1 of ($mutex, $reg, $note, $decryptor))
        )
}

Sigma Rule

title: WannaCry Ransomware Activity
id: a3596906-0ec6-471f-b539-551fe3696eea
status: stable
description: Detects WannaCry / WanaCrypt0r 2.0 ransomware components
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Chilai
date: 2026-06-23
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1210
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
    - attack.t1222.001
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
    - attack.t1490
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\tasksche.exe'
              - '\mssecsvc.exe'
              - '\taskdl.exe'
              - '\taskhsvc.exe'
              - '\taskse.exe'
              - '\111.exe'
              - '\lhdfrgui.exe'
              - '\linuxnew.exe'
              - '\wannacry.exe'
        - Image|contains: 'WanaDecryptor'
    selection_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains: '@Please_Read_Me@.txt'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical

Research By Phyo Paing Htun ( ChiLai )