Antares Research

Tracing ToneShell: Mustang Panda's Evolving Tradecraft and Campaign Infrastructure

Tracing ToneShell cover

Analysis Date: July 30, 2025

Classification: TLP:WHITE

Executive Summary

This report offers an examination of Mustang Panda's use of the ToneShell Backdoor, based on our team's original malware sample collection and investigation.

Through a comprehensive digital forensic and incident response (DFIR) analysis, we uncover the malware's behavior and operational footprint. Our detection engineering efforts identify opportunities for proactive defense, while link analysis of a shared C2 IP uncovers relationships between multiple campaigns.

Key Findings:

Active Campaign: Mustang Panda continues to leverage DLL sideloading techniques with ToneShell backdoor deployment against government and military targets

Dual Persistence: Implementation of both registry run keys and task scheduler mechanisms for redundant persistence

Infrastructure Reuse: C2 server 218.255.96.245 demonstrates operational continuity across DOPLUGS, PUBLOAD, and ToneShell campaigns Detection Evasion: Chrome process masquerading and legitimate binary abuse for defense evasion

Campaign Timeline: Active operations observed from March to July 2025 with consistent targeting patterns

Threat Actor: Mustang Panda (also known as Earth Preta, HIVE0154, RedDelta, Bronze President)

Confidence Level: High

Mustang Panda is a China-aligned cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012, consistently targeting government entities, military organizations, and NGOs across Asia-Pacific and Europe. The group is characterized by their signature use of DLL sideloading techniques and military-themed lures in spear-phishing campaigns. Recent analysis confirms continued operations with enhanced evasion capabilities and infrastructure reuse patterns consistent with previous campaign.

Evidence figure 02

Technical Details

Initial Access and Delivery

The observed attack begins with spear-phishing emails containing malicious archives themed as military documents. The initial delivery vector consists of:

Archive Contents:

Evidence figure 03

The archive mustang_panda[.]zip contains Dropper.exe (2,227,600 bytes), a malicious binary that deploys legitimate Chrome components, and a 101.0.4951.41 folder housing a malicious DLL and a manifest file.

Social Engineering Tactic: Upon execution, victims are presented with a deceptive error message: "Error: File Corrupted - The PDF file is corrupted. Please restart your computer to try again". This message serves to distract users while malicious processes execute in the background.

Execution

DLL Sideloading Mechanism:

User executes Dropper.exe (malicious binary that displays “The PDF file is corrupted. Please restart your computer to try again”)

Evidence figure 04

Dropper.exe deploys legitimate Chrome binary as ChromePDF.exe to C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser\ ChromePDF.exe (legitimate Chrome binary) searches for chrome_elf.dll in its local directory

Evidence figure 05
VT Reputation of chrome_elf.dll
VT Reputation of chrome_elf.dll

Malicious DLL initiates infection chain while masquerading as legitimate Chrome process

File System Artifacts:

The malware establishes persistence through the following deployment process:

Evidence figure 07
Evidence figure 08

Dropper Execution: Dropper.exe (malicious) deploys legitimate Chrome binary and malicious components

Primary Location: C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser\ChromePDF.exe

DLL Location: C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser\101.0.4951.41\chrome_elf.dll

Manifest File: C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser\101.0.4951.41\101.0.4951.41.m anifest

Persistence

Mustang Panda implements a dual persistence strategy ensuring redundant access:

Registry Run Keys:

Path: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersi on\Run

Key Name: ChromePDFBrowser

Value: C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser\ChromePDF.exe FreePDF

Evidence figure 09

Scheduled Task:

Task Name: ChromeBrowser-chromiumim Schedule: Every 5 minutes (PT5M interval)

Command: schtasks /F /Create /TN "ChromeBrowser-chromiumim" /SC minute /MO 5 /TR "C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser\ChromePDF.exe FreePDF

Evidence figure 10
Evidence figure 11
Evidence figure 12

This dual approach ensures automatic execution at user logon and continuous execution every five minutes, providing highly reliable persistence.

Command and Control

Network Communication: The ToneShell backdoor establishes communication with:

C2 Server: 218.255.96.245:443 (PUBLOAD C2 Infrastructure)

Process: ChromePDF.exe (legitimate Chrome binary) with PID : 7064 hijacked for C2 communication

Evidence figure 13
Evidence figure 14
Evidence figure 15

Protocol: Custom encrypted protocol over TLS

Signature: Traffic contains 17 03 03 bytes indicating TLS Application Data ToneShell signature (https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/latest-mustang-panda-arsenal-toneshell-and-starproxy-p1)

Evidence figure 16

Traffic Analysis: Network forensics confirmed active C2 communication with bidirectional traffic indicating successful command and control establishment. The malware uses port 443 to masquerade as legitimate HTTPS traffic for operational security.

Malicious DLL Analysis - chrome_elf.dll

Evidence figure 17

File Properties:

The malicious chrome_elf.dll (SHA-256: 216188ee52b067f761bdf3c456634ca2e84d278c8ebf35cd4cb686d45f5aaf7 b) is a 32-bit dynamic-link library compiled with Microsoft Visual C++ 8.0 Debug.

The malware masquerades as a legitimate Google Chrome component by spoofing the file description as "Google Chrome" and matching the version number (101.0.4951.41) with the hijacked Chrome binary.

Evidence figure 18

Embedded Malicious Commands:

PE Studio analysis reveals hardcoded malicious commands within the DLL, including the complete scheduled task creation command: schtasks /F /Create /TN "ChromeBrowser-chromiumim" /SC minute /MO 5 /TR "C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser\ChromePDF.exe FreePDF".

Evidence figure 19

API Function Capabilities:

The malicious DLL imports 118 Windows API functions enabling comprehensive system manipulation. Critical capabilities include process control through TerminateProcess, CreateProcessA/W, and GetCurrentProcessId, file system operations via WriteFile, FindFirstFileEx, and FindNextFile, registry modification using RegSetValueEx for persistence establishment, environment manipulation through SetEnvironmentVariable and GetEnvironmentStrings, and shell command execution via ShellExecuteW.

Evidence figure 20

Registry Persistence Artifacts:

String analysis reveals embedded registry paths including Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, confirming the DLL's capability to establish persistence through registry run keys. The malware contains multiple references to Visual Studio development paths, indicating sophisticated development environment usage for legitimate software mimicking.

Masquerading Techniques:

The malware employs advanced masquerading by maintaining identical version information (101.0.4951.41) as the legitimate Chrome installation, spoofing Google Chrome file descriptions and company metadata, implementing standard PE structure to appear as legitimate Windows DLL, and utilizing the same chrome_elf.dll filename as the authentic Chrome component to ensure successful DLL search order hijacking.

Prefetch Analysis Results:

Initial Infection (DROPPER.EXE-AF23BC17.pf):

Execution Pattern: Single execution event of malicious dropper binary

Key Activities: Legitimate Chrome binary deployment, DLL sideloading, file copying, task scheduler creation

File References: 65 files accessed including SCHTASKS.EXE for persistence setup

Evidence figure 21
Evidence figure 22

Persistent Execution (CHROMEPDF.EXE-AD96CF35.pf):

Binary Type: Legitimate Chrome binary (victim of DLL hijacking)

Execution Pattern: Multiple scheduled executions confirming task scheduler success

Behavior: Continuous DLL sideloading of malicious chrome_elf.dll from 101.0.4951.41 directory

Evidence figure 23

Threat Intelligence on C2 Infrastructure

Primary C2 Asset: 218.255.96.245

ASN: AS 9381 (HKBN Enterprise Solutions HK Limited)

Geographic Location: Hong Kong

Detection Rate: 8/94 security vendors (VirusTotal)

Campaign Linkage Analysis

Intelligence analysis reveals significant infrastructure reuse across multiple Mustang Panda campaigns:

Infrastructure Assessment

Operational Pattern: The reuse of 218.255.96.245 across multiple campaigns demonstrates Mustang Panda's operational efficiency and infrastructure investment strategy. This centralized C2 approach reduces operational overhead while creating attribution linkages that enable tracking of campaign evolution.

Multiple files observed communicating with C2
Multiple files observed communicating with C2

Historical Campaign Connections:

1.     DOPLUGS Campaign (2024)

Evidence figure 25
Evidence figure 26

Reference: Trend Micro Earth Preta Campaign Analysis

Target Geography: Asia-Pacific region

Shared Infrastructure: 218.255.96.245

2.     PUBLOAD Campaign (2024)

Evidence figure 27
Evidence figure 28

Reference: IBM X-Force HIVE0154 Analysis

Target Focus: Tibetan community organizations

Operational Overlap: Same C2 infrastructure

Target Focus: Government and military entities

Technical Evolution: Enhanced DLL sideloading capabilities

Detection and Hunting Rules

PowerShell Hunting Queries

# Hunt for Mustang Panda file artifacts

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\ProgramData" -Recurse -Include
"ChromePDF*","chrome_elf.dll" -ErrorAction
SilentlyContinue

# Check for malicious scheduled tasks

Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.TaskName -like
"*Chrome*" -and $_.TaskName -like "*chromium*"}

# Verify registry persistence

Get-ItemProperty
"HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" |
Where-Object {$_ -like "*ChromePDF*"}

# Network connection analysis

Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object {$_.RemoteAddress -eq
"218.255.96.245"}

# Process analysis for DLL sideloading

Get-Process | Where-Object {$_.ProcessName -eq "ChromePDF"
-or $_.Path -like "*ChromePDFBrowser*"}

Microsoft Defender For Endpoint Query

Rule1: Suspicious ChromePDFBrowser DLL Load

This rule detects detects the loading of 'chrome_elf.dll' from a non-standard location under 'C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser', which may indicate DLL side-loading, masquerading as Chrome components, or an attempt to bypass security controls for stealthy execution.

DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where FolderPath contains
"\\ProgramData\\ChromePDFBrowser" and FolderPath endswith
"\\chrome_elf.dll"

Rule2: Suspicious ChromePDFBrowser Executable in ProgramData

This rule detects execution of potentially malicious software from a fake Chrome-related folder.

DeviceProcessEvents | where FolderPath contains
"\\ProgramData\\ChromePDFBrowser"

Rule3: Suspicious "Conhost" Execution With Headless and Dimension Parameters

This rule can detects suspicious execution of conhost.exe with parameters such as --headless, .exe, --width, and -height, which may indicate abuse of conhost.exe to launch a hidden or headless process with custom screen dimensions. This technique may be used by malware or scripts to run payloads stealthily.

DeviceProcessEvents | where (FolderPath endswith
"\\conhost.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~
"CONHOST.EXE") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "–
headless" and ProcessCommandLine contains ".exe") and
(ProcessCommandLine contains "–width" and
ProcessCommandLine contains "-height")

Rule4: Malicious Scheduled Task Creation for ChromePDFBrowser

This rule detects suspicious scheduled task configured to run a fake Chrome-related executable at frequent

DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\schtasks.exe" or
ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "schtasks.exe")
| where (ProcessCommandLine contains "/Create" and
ProcessCommandLine contains "ChromeBrowser-chromiumim")
and (ProcessCommandLine contains
"\\ProgramData\\ChromePDFBrowser" and ProcessCommandLine
contains "ChromePDF.exe")

Rule5: Suspicious Registry Persistence via ChromePDFBrowser

This rule detects persistence mechanism using registry key associated with a potentially fake Chrome PDF tool.

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey contains
"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run"
| where RegistryValueName contains "ChromePDFBrowser"
| where RegistryValueData contains
"\\ProgramData\\ChromePDFBrowser\\ChromePDF.exe" and
RegistryValueData contains "FreePDF"

Sigma Detection

title: Suspicious ChromePDFBrowser DLL Load
id: 498422ab-9315-4753-ba59-cd24ba402fe6
status: stable
description: This rule detects detects the loading of
'chrome_elf.dll' from a non-standard location under
'C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser', which may indicate DLL
side-loading, masquerading as Chrome components, or an
attempt to bypass security controls for stealthy
execution.
references:
- internal research
author: MM-Sherlock
date: 2025-08-01
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.defense-evasion
- attackt.1574.001
- attack.t1204.002
logsource:
product: windows
category: image_load
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|contains:
'C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser'
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\chrome_elf.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious ChromePDFBrowser Executable in
ProgramData
id: 7ceed25c-1118-46ce-91c8-4001f1c5a71c
status: stable
description: This rule detects execution of potentially
malicious software from a fake Chrome-related folder.
references:
- Internal Research
author: MM-Sherlock
date: 2025-08-01
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.002
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
Image|contains: 'C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Conhost Execution With Headless and
Dimension Parameters
id: 33b3ef9f-cd97-4869-b0c3-f6d472892b52
status: stable
description: Detects suspicious execution of conhost.exe
with parameters such as --headless, .exe, --width, and -
height, which may indicate abuse of conhost.exe to launch
a hidden or headless process with custom screen
dimensions. This technique may be used by malware or
scripts to run payloads stealthily.
references:
- Internal Research
author: MM-Sherlock
date: 2025-08-01
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1218
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_image:
- Image|endswith: '\conhost.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'CONHOST.EXE'
selection_commandline:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '–headless'
- '.exe'
selection_commandparameter:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '–width'
- '-height'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Malicious Scheduled Task Creation for
ChromePDFBrowser
id: 7089b537-cb13-43a9-a9cf-55567289474d
status: stable
description: This rule detects suspicious scheduled task
configured to run a fake Chrome-related executable at
frequent
references:
- Internal Research
author: MM-Sherlock
date: 2025-08-01
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1053.005
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_image:
- Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'schtasks.exe'
selection_task:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '/Create'
- '/SC'
- 'minute'
- '/MO'
selection_name:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '/TN'
- 'ChromeBrowser-chromiumim'
selection_path:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '/TR'
- 'C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser'
- 'ChromePDF.exe'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
title: Suspicious Registry Persistence via
ChromePDFBrowser
id: 062cd5a0-557f-4330-9dd1-a0e746cb5b0e
status: stable
description: This rule detects persistence mechanism using
registry key associated with a potentially fake Chrome PDF
tool
references:
- Internal Research
author: MM-Sherlock
date: 2025-08-01
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: registry_event
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains:
'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ChromePDFBr
owser'
Details|contains|all:
-
'C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser\ChromePDF.exe'
- 'FreePDF'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Hashes

216188ee52b067f761bdf3c456634ca2e84d278c8ebf35cd4cb686d45f5aaf7b (chrome_elf.dll) c49c686c26845b9ef0913642caff101783663787579fa4432ec4740c8c685e45 (dropper.exe)

Network

218.255.96.245 (C2)

Files

C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser\ChromePDF.exe

C:\ProgramData\ChromePDFBrowser\101.0.4951.41\chrome_elf.dll

Registry Indicator

HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ChromePDFBr owser

Scheduled Task Name

ChromeBrowser-chromiumim

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Evidence figure from page 20 of the source report

Recommendations

Immediate Actions

1. IOC Hunting: Search environments for all provided indicators of compromise

2. Network Monitoring: Block communication to 218.255.96.245 and monitor for TLS traffic with 17 03 03 signatures

3. Registry Auditing: Check for unauthorized entries in CurrentVersion\Run keys

Strategic Recommendations

1. Email Security: Implement advanced email filtering mechanisms such as content inspection, heuristic analysis, and attachment sandboxing.

2. Application Control: Deploy application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized DLL loading

3. Threat Intelligence: Subscribe to feeds covering Mustang Panda TTPs and infrastructure updates

Detection Engineering 1. Deploy Detection Rules: Implement provided YARA, Sigma, and network detection rules

2. Baseline Monitoring: Establish baselines for Chrome-related process execution patterns

3. Automation: Create automated hunting queries for Mustang Panda indicators

Conclusion

This analysis examined Mustang Panda's continued evolution and operational maturity in conducting targeted espionage campaigns. The group's consistent use of DLL sideloading techniques, combined with infrastructure reuse patterns, demonstrates both operational efficiency and creates opportunities for proactive defense.

The dual persistence mechanisms and process masquerading techniques indicate sophisticated understanding of defensive technologies and evasion requirements. Organizations should prioritize detection capabilities that focus on behavioral anomalies rather than solely signature-based approaches.

The infrastructure linkage analysis connecting ToneShell, PUBLOAD, and DOPLUGS campaigns provides valuable intelligence for tracking this threat actor's operations and predicting future campaign patterns.

Researched by

Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, Zaw Min Htun, Phyo Paing Htun