Antares Research

PlugX Loader and Payload Analysis: Persistence, Process Injection and C2 Infrastructure

PlugX report cover

Attack Flow

The execution chain progresses from the desktop loader through ProgramData staging and privilege escalation to service execution, as illustrated below.

TTP Chains
TTP Chains

Hidden and System File Attributes

An adb.zip archive containing a suspected PlugX sample has been acquired for deep dive analysis. Following extraction of zip, the PlugX companion files (AdbWinApi.dat, AdbWinApi.dll, and AdbWinApi.hlp) were concealed by applying Hidden and System attributes, making them invisible in normal Windows Explorer views.

Explorer view
Explorer view
$J attributes
$J attributes
ComponentDescriptionFunction / Role
adb.exeDigitally signed by Qihoo 360 SoftwareLegitimate executable abused as the DLL side-loading host
AdbWinApi.datEncrypted PlugX shellcodeStores encrypted shellcode used in the subsequent execution chain
AdbWinApi.dllPlugX loaderLoads and processes the encrypted payload
uac.tmpDLL with UAC bypass capabilityFacilitates privilege escalation
boot.cfgC2 ConfigurationStores encrypted C2 communication configuration for subsequent decryption

Execution

The execution of adb.exe resulted in the creation of component artifacts within C:\ProgramData\adb, as captured by Sysmon file creation logs.

Sysmon file creation
Sysmon file creation

DLL SideLoading

The signed adb.exe, which loads an untrusted, application-local AdbWinApi.dll. The same DLL side-loading behavior is observed again after staging under C:\ProgramData\adb.

DLL side-loading evidence
DLL side-loading evidence

Privileges Escalation

The binary invokes rundll32.exe to load UAC.TMP (a masquerading DLL file) and call its BypassUAC export, passing the sample’s own command line (adb.exe 100 2456) as the argument. The command line is re-executed with elevated privileges so the next stage can install persistence. Mode 100 selects the install and persistence routine, and 2456 is the PID of the parent adb.exe that started the process.

Privilege Escalation Artifacts
Privilege Escalation Artifacts

Process Injection

When launched with the argument 200, adb.exe creates %SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe suspended with the command line svchost.exe 201 0 and injects its payload into it; the missing -k service group is unusual for a legitimate svchost.exe.

The injected svchost.exe then creates msiexec.exe 209 <PID> in each logged-on user session using a duplicated user token (<PID> is the parent svchost.exe), and injects the same payload into it.

adb.exe
└─> adb.exe 200 0                 (parent command line)
   └─> svchost.exe 201 0          (child command line;
suspended and injected)
     └─> msiexec.exe 209 <PID>    (child command line;
created per user session and injected)
Execution Mode
100 - Bypass UAC
200 - Injector / launcher
201 - Main RAT
209 - Per-user-session helper

Persistence Mechanism

The malware establishes persistence by creating or modifying a Windows service registry entry under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Adb.

Registry Artifact
Registry Artifact

Command & Control

The primary svchost.exe stage queried tools.daji8[.]me while executing under the SYSTEM account. The successful DNS resolution links the domain to the same process exhibiting extensive process access activity.

C2 Domain
C2 Domain

A Network Intrusion Analyzer alert for "ET MALWARE Win32/PlugX Variant CnC Activity" was triggered by traffic to tools.daji8[.]me (resolving to 111.68.15[.]220). As shown below, this Suricata alert directly validates the PlugX indicator of compromise (IOC) discovered during our host-level forensic analysis.

Suricata alert
Suricata alert

PlugX Code Analysis Section

PlugX Configuration Extraction

The PlugX loader invokes sub_10004790 to open boot.cfg, retrieve its file size, and read the encrypted contents into memory for subsequent decryption and processing.

Configuration file read routine
Configuration file read routine
#ReadFile operation (sub_10004790)
mov     edx, [ebp+arg_0]
push    eax             ; lpOverlapped
mov     eax, [edx+4]
lea     ecx, [ebp+NumberOfBytesRead]
push    ecx             ; lpNumberOfBytesRead
push    edi             ; nNumberOfBytesToRead
push    eax             ; lpBuffer
push    ebx             ; hFile
call    ds:ReadFile
test    eax, eax
jnz     short loc_100047FF
#Retrieval of the 4-byte decryption key from the embedded
config and call to the decryption routine
loc_10018A86:
mov     eax, [edi]
push    150Ch
push    edi
lea     ecx, [esp+2A58h+var_2A20]
call    sub_10008760
test    eax, eax
jnz     short loc_10018A3D

Decryption routine of the PlugX config

Configuration decryption routine
Configuration decryption routine

As shown below, decryption of the PlugX configuration payload successfully revealed the embedded C2 address:

Decrypted configuration
Decrypted configuration

PlugX – C2 Infrastructure Correlation & External Intelligence Assessment

The HTTP header fingerprint of 111.68.15[.]220 was used as a pivot for Shodan searches, identifying three additional IP addresses exhibiting the same HTTP header pattern and expanding the investigation into a four-IP C2 infrastructure cluster.

Shodan Result
Shodan Result
Clustering C2 Matrix
Clustering C2 Matrix
Reference Registers
Reference Registers

Assessment: We assess with moderate confidence that 111.68.15.220 is likely part of infrastructure used by Earth Berberoka.

Biases: We observed this host serving a PlugX payload. It shares HTTP header hash -1437090248 and the parent-domain association (daji8[.]me) with infrastructure reported by Trend Micro as linked to Earth Berberoka.

Gaps: The IP does not appear in the Trend Micro IOC set, the lookalike IP’s attribution rests on a single unverified OTX pulse, and all hosts were unresponsive, which prevented further collection.

Appendix

Indicator of Compromise

ArtifactTypeIndicator
Adb.exeSHA-256ef4c7f4c417c18cd3394dd81ccd94381af252e0af81b0ad89b7e6d81412f4706
Adb.datSHA-25688045766007380b99fa7874c633d66bcb17d3314b6145ad5f8d8216e8e24b375
UAC.TMPSHA-256b3d819160421011c002e1c4bd2621b15566134937e700697258eba954de5836b
AdbWinApi.dllSHA-25635311bb7becba40d1fd99414cc1d14db837630e3ea13804442698b777476fe76
Boot.cfgSHA-256A0130462172EF03869349D9FFF564E9F66A76F31FCCEDED5D7AE5F9C64C42563
C2 domainDomaintools[.]daji8[.]me
C2 addressIPv4111.68.15.220

MITRE Mapping

T1574.001 - Hijack Execution Flow DLL
T1047 - Windows Management Instrumentation
T1218.011 - Rundll32
T1112 - Modify Registry
T1548.002 - Bypass User Account Control
T1543.003 - Windows Service
T1564.001 - Hidden Files and Directories
T1055 - Process Injection
T1057 - Process Discovery
T1095 - Non Application Layer Protocol

KQL

PlugX Persistence via Adb Service Registry Modification

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where (RegistryKey contains "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\Adb" and RegistryKey contains "ImagePath") and RegistryValueData contains "ProgramData\\adb\\adb.exe"

PlugX UAC Bypass via Rundll32 Loading TMP With BypassUAC Export

DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\rundll32.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "RUNDLL32.EXE") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "BypassUAC")

PlugX DLL Sideloading - Untrusted AdbWinApi.dll Loaded From ProgramData

DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\AdbWinApi.dll" and FolderPath contains "ProgramData\\adb"

Disclaimer: This research was performed independently and in our personal capacity. It does not represent the views of employer, past or present, or of any affiliated organization, and no confidential or proprietary information from any employer was used. The findings are provided for informational and defensive purposes only, “as is”, without warranty. Some conclusions are based on static analysis and may be revised as more information becomes available.