Antares Research

Canon Under Fire: UNC6384's Multi-Stage PlugX Campaign Through Trusted Software

Canon Under Fire cover

Analysis Classification: TLP:WHITE

Type: Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) - PRC-nexus threat actor UNC6384

Sample: 62b2a9.msi (MSI Package Dropper)

Malware Family: PlugX/Korplug (CANONSTAGER variant)

Executive Summary

This report provides an in-depth examination of a UNC6384 campaign utilizing MSI package abuse combined with DLL side-loading techniques. The campaign demonstrates sophisticated understanding of Windows internals and employs multiple redundancy mechanisms to ensure persistent access while evading detection.

The attack chain leverages Windows Installer functionality for initial deployment. It abuses legitimate Canon printer software for DLL side-loading. Registry-based persistence uses deceptive naming conventions. Multiple anti-forensic techniques include time stomping and self-replication across diverse file system locations.

Key Findings

Self-Replication : The malware copies itself to multiple locations using dynamic directory names. Observed paths include randomized AppData folders, VirtualFile directories, and system-wide ProgramData locations. This provides operational redundancy and complicates removal efforts.

Timestomping : File creation timestamps are backdated to 2025/03. This makes new files appear as pre-existing components. Timeline-based threat hunting is evaded. Sysmon captured both fraudulent and authentic timestamps.

Persistence Mechanism : A registry Run key named "CanonPrinter" ensures automatic execution at logon. The naming exploits user familiarity with Canon software. Multiple instances point to different file locations for redundancy.

Network Infrastructure : DNS queries target renxinguo.com, flagged by nine security vendors. Associated IP 172.67.136.169 belongs to ASN 13335 Cloudflare infrastructure.

In-Memory Execution : The RC4-encrypted payload deploys directly into memory without touching disk. A custom mutex "rSGzGKyej" enforces single-instance operation. Process injection indicators confirmed malicious memory manipulation.

Attack Chain

UNC6384 Attack Chain
UNC6384 Attack Chain

Technical Details

Initial Access and MSI Execution Analysis

MSI Package Execution : The MSI file 62b2a9.msi contains embedded malicious components disguised as Canon printer software.

Evidence figure 03
Evidence figure 04

File System Operations and Deployment

Primary Installation Location

The MSI dropped three files into AppData\Local\EbNTtKIlBtO, a directory whose randomized alphanumeric name is likely intended to evade pattern-based detection and blend with legitimate application folders. Static and dynamic analysis indicate the installer delivers three components such as cnmplog.dat, cnmpaui.dll, and cnmpaui.exe, where cnmpaui.exe is a legitimately signed Canon binary likely abused to impart trust and enable execution, cnmpaui.dll acts as a malicious PlugX DLL, and cnmplog.dat contains an encrypted payload that is staged and executed in memory.

Evidence figure 05
Evidence figure 06

Analysis of PlugX dll

cnmpaui.dll This contains the PlugX/Korplug loader code (CANONSTAGER). The DLL lacks any digital signature and would fail validation checks. However, Windows doesn't enforce signature requirements on loaded DLLs by default. Multiple security vendors identify this as Trojan.Korplug.

Evidence figure 07

cnmplog.dat : This file contains the RC4-encrypted final-stage payload.

Evidence figure 08

Self-Replication and Multi-Location Propagation

Propagation Behavior

After initial infection, cnmpaui.exe executes file copy operations. All three components replicate to multiple locations. This creates redundant infection chains across the file system.

First Propagation - ProgramData

Target: C:\ProgramData\VirtualFile\ Copied: cnmpaui.exe, cnmpaui.dll, cnmplog.dat

Evidence figure 09

Second Propagation - User Profile

Target: C:\Users[USER]\Intelnet\ Copied: cnmpaui.exe, cnmpaui.dll, cnmplog.dat Rationale: Different directory name indicates dynamic path selection

Evidence figure 10

Third Propagation - Roaming Profile

Target: C:\Users[USER]\AppData\Roaming\VirtualFile\ Copied: cnmpaui.exe, cnmpaui.dll, cnmplog.dat

Evidence figure 11

Summary: The malware propagates into multiple directories to ensure redundant persistence, making removal more difficult by maintaining several active copies across the system.

Forensic Evidence of File Timestamp Tampering

Sysmon Event ID 2 detected a timestamp tampering activity performed by msiexec.exe during installation.

File: cnmpaui.exe

Modified Timestamp: 2025-03-17 22:41:46

Actual Creation Time: 2025-10-05 08:22:25.534

Difference: ~7 months backdated

Sysmon retained both values, with the PreviousCreationUtcTime field serving as forensic evidence of the timestamp manipulation.

Evidence figure 12

DLL Side-Loading Technique

A malicious cnmpaui.dll placed in the same folder was loaded immediately after the legitimate, signed Canon executable (version 1.05.2.20). The signed executable established a trusted context, and the unsigned cnmpaui.dll inherited that trust when loaded.

Evidence figure 13

Persistence Mechanism

Sysmon Event ID 13 recorded multiple registry value creations under the Run key \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, indicating attempts to establish redundant persistence. The values referenced the same executable placed in different directories:

%AppData%\Roaming\VirtualFile\cnmpaui.exe

%ProgramData%\VirtualFile\cnmpaui.exe

The modifications were performed by the cnmpaui.exe process, demonstrating deliberate replication of persistence entries to ensure execution resilience across reboots.

Evidence figure 14
Evidence figure 15

Network Communications and Command & Control

DNS Query Activity

FakeNet confirmed execution of the MSI installer, outbound connections to renxinguo[.]com were observed.

Evidence figure 16

Domain Reputation

VirusTotal reports 9 of 98 vendors flagging as malicious.

Evidence figure 17

Associated IP 172.67.136.169 belongs to ASN 13335 (CLOUDFLARENET, US), providing proxy services. The domain is geolocated to Ascension Island. Threat actors commonly leverage Cloudflare infrastructure to mask C2 traffic and evade detection.

Evidence figure 18

Prefetch and MFT Forensic Evidence

Prefetch Analysis

Multiple entries indicate repeated executions across different time periods. This validates persistence mechanism functionality.

Evidence figure 19
Evidence figure 20

MFT Timeline (Confirmed File Locations)

Master File Table analysis shows complete file system operations:

\Users[USER]\AppData\Local\EbNTtKIlBtO\

\Users[USER]\AppData\Roaming\VirtualFile\

\Users[USER]\Intelnet\

\ProgramData\VirtualFile\

Evidence figure 21
Evidence figure 22
Evidence figure 23

FileCreate, DataOverwrite, DataExtend, and BasicInfoChange operations were logged. This provides forensic evidence of active malicious functionality

Evidence figure 24

Memory Forensic Analysis

Process Tree In Memory

msiexec.exe spawning the cnmpaui.exe which consistent with MSI abuse / LOLBAS installation. msiexec.exe launching an EXE from %LOCALAPPDATA%\... is abnormal and commonly used to stage payloads without writing to Program Files.

Evidence figure from page 10 of the source report

DLL Side-Loading via Canon IJ Printer Assistant Tool In Memory

A legitimate, signed Canon executable (CNMPAUI.EXE) was launched from a user-writable staging folder and immediately loaded an unsigned companion DLL (cnmpaui.dll) from the same directory as a classic DLL side-loading pattern.

Evidence figure from page 11 of the source report

Mutex Artifact Identified During Memory Analysis

Memory forensic analysis using Volatility identified a mutex object named rSGzGKyej, indicating potential malware synchronization or process coordination behavior. Such mutex values are commonly used by malware to prevent multiple instances from running simultaneously and to mark infection presence on the system.

Evidence figure 25

Registry Artifacts in Memory

Registry pattern scanning identified persistence artifacts in memory:

Offset: 0x808b044da7d8

Text: CanonPrinter

Hex: 43 61 6e 6f 6e 50 72 69 6e 74 65 72

The registry value name persists in process memory. This corroborates live registry analysis and validates persistence mechanism findings.

Evidence figure 26

Pivoting

Additionally, we identified files such as cnmpaui.dll and cnmplog.dat with distinct hashes associated with renxinguo[.]com, suggesting the presence of variant samples or recompiled iterations leveraging the same C2 infrastructure. The identified hash values are as follows:

cnmpaui.dll -fd65d192f2425916585450e46c9cc1db7747d00d1614a8ef835940f06795e2b4

cnmpaui.dat -55e0e9167fa3612135815ed01119a91281373c08c257efc8f7cc36bcc08734d2

Evidence figure 27

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Evidence figure 28
Evidence figure 29

Indicators of Compromise

File Hashes

9023a0c8a43282ff42abb917bc7e3163b421296d23c47ff2a0275425ea1caf40 (62b2a9.msi)

4ed76fa68ef9e1a7705a849d47b3d9dcdf969e332bd5bcb68138579c288a16d3 (cnmpaui.exe)

f7012e1ae246646fa8e87511272f0e9931227e8b7a5f186efb9a6c77913a00e0 cnmpaui.dll (CANONSTAGER/PlugX)

cc4db3d8049043fa62326d0b3341960f9a0cf9b54c2fbbdffdbd8761d99add79 cnmplog.dat (Encrypted Payload)

Network Indicators

Domain: renxinguo[.]com

Cloudflare IP: 172.67.136.169

File Paths

\Users\[USER]\AppData\Local\EbNTtKIlBtO\

\Users\[USER]\AppData\Roaming\VirtualFile\

\Users\[USER]\Intelnet\

\ProgramData\VirtualFile\

Registry Keys

HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

Value: CanonPrinter

Mutex

rSGzGKyej

Detection Engineering

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - T1547.001

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryKey contains
@"\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
| where RegistryValueName contains "CanonPrinter"
| where RegistryValueData contains @" \cnmpaui.exe"

User Execution: Malicious File - T1204.002

DeviceFileEvents
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
| where FolderPath has_any (
@"\AppData\Local\EbNTtKIlBtO\",
@"\AppData\Roaming\VirtualFile\",
@"\Intelnet\",
@"\ProgramData\VirtualFile\"
)
| where FileName has_any ("cnmpaui.exe", "cnmpaui.dll",
"cnmplog.dat")

Mitigation

# Kill malicious processes
Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -eq "cnmpaui"
-or $_.Path -like "*cnmpaui.exe*" } | Stop-Process -Force
# Remove registry persistence
Remove-ItemProperty -Path
"HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -
Name "CanonPrinter" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
# Delete all malicious directories
Remove-Item -Path "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\EbNTtKIlBtO" -Recurse
-Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item -Path "$env:APPDATA\VirtualFile" -Recurse -
Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item -Path "$env:USERPROFILE\Intelnet" -Recurse -
Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item -Path "C:\ProgramData\VirtualFile" -Recurse -
Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
# Block DNS resolution
Add-Content -Path "C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts"
-Value "`n0.0.0.0 renxinguo.com" -ErrorAction
SilentlyContinue

Conclusion

This UNC6384 campaign demonstrates continued evolution of PRC-nexus cyber espionage operations. The combination of MSI abuse with DLL side-loading leverages legitimate software trust while deploying sophisticated malware. Multi-stage deployment, extensive anti-forensics, and redundant persistence indicate mature operational security.

The abuse of Canon printer software through DLL hijacking represents concerning evolution in defense evasion. Exploiting code signing trust and software brand recognition makes detection significantly harder. PlugX/Korplug continues demonstrating operational effectiveness across a decade of Chinese state-sponsored campaigns.

Research By PHYO PAING HTUN, KYAW PYIYT HTET